{"id":33214,"date":"2012-09-05T09:30:49","date_gmt":"2012-09-05T13:30:49","guid":{"rendered":"http:\/\/spacingtoronto.ca\/?p=33214"},"modified":"2012-09-05T11:08:22","modified_gmt":"2012-09-05T15:08:22","slug":"lorinc-forgetful-ford-gets-his-day-in-court","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/spacing.ca\/toronto\/2012\/09\/05\/lorinc-forgetful-ford-gets-his-day-in-court\/","title":{"rendered":"LORINC: Forgetful Ford gets his day in court"},"content":{"rendered":"

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When the lawyers, the press, and the idly curious take their places in a University Avenue courtroom this morning, all eyes will be on the unprecedented spectacle of a sitting mayor forced onto the witness stand. There, Rob Ford will try to explain, under oath, why he didn\u2019t breach the Municipal Conflict of Interest Act in February, when he spoke and voted on an item in which he had a financial interest.<\/p>\n

Ford\u2019s lawyer, Alan Lenczner, is expected to mount several arguments on behalf of his client — two aimed at discrediting the legal framework around council\u2019s code of conduct process, and two directed towards the defenses allowed in Section 10(2) of the Act. These latter allow a court to dismiss an application if the breach was inadvertent or an error in judgment.<\/p>\n

During his much-quoted deputation with Clayton Ruby, Ford made quick work of defense number one. When Ruby asked if he\u2019d meant to stand up and speak to the item, Ford replied, \u201cAbsolutely.\u201d<\/p>\n

In other words, the lynch pin in this trial has to do with whether Ford and Lenczner can convince the court that his decision to speak and vote represented an honest error in judgment — and this notwithstanding his contrition-free comments last week that the case was nothing but politics.<\/p>\n

At one level, Ford\u2019s defense seems like a no-brainer. If he hadn\u2019t made an error in judgment, we wouldn\u2019t be in this mess in the first place. Moreover, the error in judgment defense seems like a gaping escape hatch, a legalistic way of saying, \u201cI really screwed the pooch this time.\u201d Say a couple of Hail Marys and don\u2019t do it again.<\/p>\n

Too simplistic? I\u2019m guessing the trial will feature a considerable amount of back-and-forth over the exact legal meaning of this phrase.<\/p>\n

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For the record, here\u2019s what I found in the legal databases.<\/p>\n

In a 2009 case<\/a> involving allegations against former Vaughan mayor Linda Jackson, a judge wrote the following about the Act\u2019s objectives:<\/p>\n

\u201cThe obvious purpose of the Act<\/a> [Municipal Conflict of Interest Act<\/em><\/a> (1972)] is to prohibit members of council and local boards from engaging in the decision-making process in respect to matters in which they have a personal economic interest. The scope of the Act<\/a> is not limited by exception or proviso but applies to all situations in which the member has, or is deemed to have, any direct or indirect pecuniary interest. There is no need to find corruption on his part or actual loss on the part of the council or board. So long as the member fails to honour the standard of conduct prescribed by the statute, then, regardless of his good faith or the propriety of his motive, he is in contravention of the statute.\u201d<\/p><\/blockquote>\n

The ruling in that case included this lengthy passage from a 1979 judgment:<\/p>\n

\u201cThis enactment, like all conflict of interest rules, is based on the moral principle, long embodied in our jurisprudence, that no man can serve two masters. It recognizes the fact that the judgment of even the most well-meaning men and women may be impaired when their personal financial interests are affected<\/em>. Public office is a trust conferred by public authority for public purpose. And the Act<\/a>, by its broad proscription, enjoins holders of public offices within its ambit from any participation in matters in which their economic self-interest may be in conflict with their public duty. The public\u2019s confidence in its elected representatives demands no less\u2026 Legislation of this nature must, it is clear, be construed broadly and in a manner consistent with its purpose\u2026.\u201d [emphasis added].<\/p><\/blockquote>\n

The language suggests that Ford\u2019s endless refrain about the benign purpose of his football foundation may not cut the mustard, legally speaking.<\/p>\n

In another 2009 case<\/a> — in which school board trustee Oliver Carroll was turfed from office because he\u2019d participated in staff budget decisions despite the fact that his daughter taught for the board \u2013 the judge may several noteworthy observations about the error in judgment defense:<\/p>\n